The persistence of demand for branded drugs when cheaper perfect substitutes become available means that physicians and patients develop choice habits that are not easily changed [9, 14] ). Physicians may become loyal to some drug companies, which may steer their choice of drugs irrespective of the price. Habit formation is of particular importance in this market since physicians do not have economic incentives to let drug prices affect their choices or to keep themselves informed about new generics entering the market. Physicians have incentives to serve the interests of their patients, but the insurance schemes in many countries make the patient ignorant about drug prices. In most countries, therefore, drug prices are subject to regulation. Regulating prices when the drug producer has a patent, and only imperfect substitutes are available involves bilateral bargaining that leaves some market power to the producer. Once patent protection expires, and generic producers may enter, regulation can be substantially improved by introducing benchmarking schemes.
This contribution studies competition between generics and branded drugs in the Norwegian market, in particular how competition responded to a recent regulatory reform involving benchmarking. There is an extensive literature on the effect of generic entry on prices but few examples of empirical studies of the performance of price regulation schemes as such. The reform in Norway presents a unique policy experiment allowing us to investigate the performance of yardstickbased price regulation.
For this purpose we develop an empirical model with two components. First, we estimate a demand model in which physician-patient's choices follows from a discrete choice structure with random utility function, which implies multinomial logit choice probabilities. Second, assuming that the drug producers set prices noncooperatively to maximize profit and adhering to our estimated price elasticities, we derive a time-conditioned measure of market power-the Lerner index-for each product. Our model belongs to the class of models studied by Berry [1] and Berry et al. [2] .
Our results suggest that the yardstickbased price scheme had a significant impact on market power. Generic drugs experience a significant increase in demand after the reform, and the estimated first order regressive process of market power reveals that competition works. Furthermore, the estimated effect of yardstickbased regulation on demand indicates reduced market power.
Several studies provide insights on the nature of competition in the market for pharmaceuticals after patent expiration. Grabowski and Vernon [7] examine the effect of generic entry in the United States market on prices for 18 drugs that were first exposed to generic competition during the years 1983-1987. Their descriptive statistics reveal that the branded drug price increased by an average of 7 1 year after generic entry and 11 2 years after generic entry. At the same time generic prices continue to fall after first entry. The average generic price 2 years after entry was 35 lower than the first entry price.
Frank and Salkever [6] arrived at similar results when they looked at a sample of 32 drugs that lost patent protection during early to middle 1980s. More competition among generic drug producers is found to cause price reductions for those drugs. Increased competition from generic drugs, however, is not accompanied by lower prices on branded drugs. Their results suggest instead a small price increase on branded drugs. Caves et al. [5] investigate the experience of 30 drugs that lost patent protection between 1976 and 1987. Their result differs from that of Frank and Salkever [6] . The branded drug price declines with the number of generic entrants, but the rate of decline is small. For the mean number of generic drugs, the brand name price declines by 4.5 only. At the same time generic prices are much lower than the brand name prices. Their results suggest that average generic price is about 50 of the branded drug price when three generic producers have entered the market.
Whereas these studies concern the effect of competition on prices, Hudson [10] reports results on the determinants of generic entry itself. In his data generic firms in the United States market took up 70 of the 50 chemical entities that went off patent in the years 1985-1996. The extent of generic entry varies between countries. In the United Kingdom market, for example, generic producers took up only 37 of the drugs. Market size in terms of sales value increases the likelihood of generic entry.
Our focus is on the effect of regulatory schemes and not on the competition between branded and generic drugs. Pavcnik [12] offers a recent study of regulatory schemes. Using data from the German market she investigates what effect the introduction of reference-pricing had on competition between branded and generic drugs. Drug prices are found to drop after the introduction, and generic competition is shown to play an important role in this process. The price on branded drugs fell on average by more than the price on generic drugs. The price drop on branded drugs increases with the number of generics in the market. Winkelmann [15] studies another aspect of the statutory health insurance in Germany. The prescription fee paid by the patient increased substantially in 1997. This price increase on prescription drug is found to reduce the number of physician visits on average by 10. Following a brief overview of the Norwegian market for pharmaceuticals and its reforms we present the data used in the analysis, our demand model, and the price setting features.
The pharmaceutical market in Norway
As in most other countries the pharmaceutical market in Norway is subject to regulation. Regulation of prescription drugs concerns both producers' entry and pricing decisions and the pharmacies' retail margins, whereas the regulation of over-the-counter drugs concerns entry decisions only. The regulatory authority related to the pharmaceutical sector is the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. The Ministry and its agency (Norwegian Medicines Control authority) control the entry of new type of drugs, wholesale prices, and retail margins. The manufacturer price is not regulated.
The Norwegian Health System offers statutory public health insurance, and close to 70 of total drug expenses are covered by this insurance scheme. These expenses have been increasing rather rapidly due to an aging population and entry of new and more expensive drugs. Looking at drugs that are approved for reimbursement by the social insurance schemes, the share of total cost paid by the patient amounts to 11 in Norway. This is much lower than in other Nordic countries. In Denmark the share is 42 and in Sweden 26. In the United Kingdom, Spain, and France patients pay only 6-7 of total costs (data from Farmastat, 2005; all figures are 2002 observations).
During the past decade several reforms have been implemented to encourage switching to generic drugs. Parallel imports were introduced in 1998, and pharmacists were allowed to keep 50 of the savings if they were able to obtain lower prices on these drugs. In 1999 physicians were required to prescribe the generic with the lowest price. However, this recommendation and the reference price system used proved insufficient to increase physicians' awareness on prices.
In Norway two recent reforms have been introduced to foster competition and to lower prices. Generic substitution was introduced in March 2001. Generic substitution ensures that the actual choice of drug producer is made less dependent on physicians' prescription policy. For a sample of about 100 drugs (chemical substances), pharmacies were permitted to substitute a generic for a branded drug, independently of which producer that was prescribed by the physician. Being permitted to intervene between the physician and the patient, the pharmacies now have an important influence on whether the branded drug or a generic drug is chosen. Generic substitution therefore is expected to lower barriers to entry for generic drugs by reducing the importance of prescription habits for actual drug choices in pharmacies. The problem with this scheme proved that vertically integrated wholesalers and retailers could still sell these (cheaper drugs) at prices equal to the fixed price cap. No link was introduced between the wholesalers' input prices (producer prices) and the retailers' price caps [13] . (Generic substitution was introduced together with a substantial liberalization of the pharmacy market. The new pharmacy act of 2001 abolished restrictions on ownership, and most pharmacies were sold to the three main wholesalers. The Norwegian market is now characterized by three vertically integrated distribution companies, without legal regulation on entry of new companies or pharmacy outlets.)
The reform of March 2003 established such a link. The retail price cap, termed the "index price," on a drug (chemical substance) was updated every 3 months and set equal to the average of the three lowest reported producer prices on that drug, plus a fixed distribution (wholesale and retail) margin. If a retailer selects a producer with a price exceeding the average of the three lowest prices, the net margin of the integrated retailer-wholesale pharmacy firm drops, whereas a retailer selecting a producer with a lower producer price experiences an increase in his net margin. The reform is both expected to trigger price competition between producers and to reduce the retail prices.
Data
The dataset is provided by the Norwegian Social Insurance Agency and covers monthly observation of the six chemical substances included in the index price system. The data were collected at 22 pharmacies in Norway in the period 1998-2004. The sample of pharmacies is considered to be representative for the sale of drugs in Norway. The main variables reported by the pharmacies are volume of sale, both in retail value (Norwegian kroner, NOK, in November 2005 US$ 1 was approx. 6.80 NOK) and number of defined daily doses (DDD) for each product. These are used to calculate the prices per DDD and market shares of each product within the submarket (chemical substance).
Note that the number of products exceed the number of producers of a chemical substance because a drug is sold in different versions according to strength, presentation form (pills or fluid), and package size. For each of the six chemical substances we have selected the version with the highest sales value. The chemical substances subjected to index price regulation and covered by our data are presented in . Table 1 . The products are classified as the branded drug (original patented product), parallel imported branded drug, or generic drug.
Appendix A reports the development of prices and market shares for the products in these six markets. The time period is 1998-2004. We observe that prices and market shares of the branded drugs started to decline a little before the generics entered the market. The decline in the market shares of the branded drugs prior to entry of generics is due an increase in the market share of the parallel imports, from lower price countries such as Spain and Greece. When generics enter the market, there are a further decline in the market share of the branded drugs and a further drop in the prices of branded drugs.
A demand model
The institutional settings in the pharmaceutical market define a complex mechanism for drug choices. Demand for drugs is often assumed to follow from the physician's choices as the patient's agent. Looking at submarkets with generic substitution, pharmacies may intervene in the actual choice of drug. Total demand for a drug, with a given chemical substance, is still determined by the physicians, but pharmacies become important for the actual choice of producer within the market defined by the chemical substance. As explained above, pharmacies are required by law to substitute the prescribed product with a cheaper product/producer (if available). Importantly, both the patient and the physician are allowed to prevent substitution. The physician can add a reservation to the prescription which prohibits pharmacies to substitute. Even without such a reservation the patient may insist on the prescribed product. In this case the insurance scheme does not cover the price difference between the prescribed product and the cheapest available. The difference is paid by the patient himself. We assume that the physician/patient alliance's choice maximizes the utility of the patient. All patients are assumed to have the same deterministic part of the indirect utility. Let I m be the number of drugs (producers) available in market m, where a market is defined by the chemical substance (lowest level of the ATC code). The indirect utility from drug i =1,2,I m in market m, m =1,2,..,6 in month t, by patient/physician n is random, and given by U imnt = g imt +a mt P mt + e imnt , where P imt is the price of drug i in market m at time t; g imt is a drug specific effect, and e imnt is a random variable identically and independently extreme value distributed across drugs, markets, patients/physicians and time. Heterogeneity in patient/physician preferences is represented by the iid error term. a imt is a coefficient related to price.
The probability that patient/physician n will choose drug i in market m at time t is given by: Because all individuals have the same deterministic part of the utility function, the observed parallel to the log of the relative probabilities equals the log of the market share of drug i relative to the market share of drug 1.
We assume that:
imt im imt mt g g v ;i 1,2,,,I = + = g im is a constant that varies across drug types and reflects some attributes of the drugs beyond price. Although these drugs are very close substitutes since they all contain the same active ingredients, there are still reasons to believe that drug specific effects are present. One reason is that the drugs differ with respect to inert ingredients, shape, packaging, and labeling. In addition, the producers run advertising campaigns that might affect the physicians' choice of a certain drug.
The parameter v imt is a random variable assumed to have zero expectation, with constant and equal variance across drugs, markets and time, assumed not to be correlated across drugs, markets, or time.
A general characteristic of the drug market is that branded drugs are able to maintain large market shares and high prices after the entry of cheaper generic drugs. Although generic drugs enter with substantial lower prices, demand responds are often weak. To capture this we allow branded and generic drugs to have different price responses. Moreover, the price response on demand for generic drugs are allowed to depend on the market age of the specific drug:
Here a 0 is a constant that we expect to be negative since it captures the direct effect of price on demand. This direct price response is assumed the same across drugs and markets. For the price to have negative impact on demand a imt has to be negative.
GD imt is a dummy variable. GD imt =1 if drug i in market m is a generic drug. Since parallel imported branded drugs are not treated as generic drugs, not all drugs i ≠1 are generic drugs. [Note that demand, i.e., the log odds ratios, is always measured relative to the branded drug (drug 1). The generic dummy controls for parallel imported drug as well. When GD imt =0, it means that drug i in market m is a parallel imported branded drug.] A imt equals the number of months drug i ≠1 has been on the market. Thus the ratio of A imt to A 1mt measures the "market age" of drug i relative to the "market age" of the branded product. If the drug as been in the market since 1998, the ratio is equal to 1. For younger drugs the ratio takes values less than one. Total price response for the branded drug is captured by the direct effect a 0 , whereas for the generic drugs "the market age" of the drug is allowed to matter. If for given prices generic drugs experience increased demand as market age increases, a 1 will be positive.
The new regulation scheme, the index price system, was introduced March 2003. In order to identify the effect on demand for generic drugs we present this new policy in our log odds ratio equation above by the variable τ t , which takes the value 1 for t=March 2003 and the following months, and 0 otherwise.
Thus the log odds ratio that we estimate is the following: Because Eq. 5 is derived from utility maximization (see Eq. 1), Eq. 5 is a de- 
where a imt is given in Eq. 4. There are two important time effects on the direct price elasticity of generic drugs. Note that:
for a generic drug. If a 1 ≥0, the numerical value of the price coefficient a imt decreases over time, and consequently the price elasticity of generic drugs decreases over time. This time effect is reinforced by the expected increase in market shares following the introduction of the index price reform. Increased market shares will for given prices reduce the price elasticity. Note that for the branded drugs a imt = a 0 . If the reform works to increase market shares of generic drugs, there will be a corresponding increase in the own-price elasticity of branded drugs. The relative age of drug i in the market is an alternative to introducing a time trend in the demand equations.
Market power
We assume that the producers set prices in order to maximize expected profit, given the prices set by the other producers. Thus the prices are set in a noncooperative game of the Bertrand-Nash type. Expected profit, denoted π imt is given by:
where c imt is a constant unit cost of producing and distributing drug i in market m at time, N mt are the number of patients in market m at time t, and K imt is fixed costs. Maximizing π imt with respect to price P imt gives the following price equation:
An indicator of market power is the socalled Lerner index, defined as:
Inserting the price Eq. 8, we obtain:
By convention we set L imt =1 when there is a monopoly. We note that under perfect competition L imt =0. If competition works, high price-cost margins in the market would attract entry of generics. When the maximal market power is high, as measured by the Lerner index, more firms will enter and profit margins will gradually be reduced. If this is the case, the market power that firm i in market m can obtain at time t follows a first order regressive process. To investigate whether this mechanism is at work in the Norwegian pharmaceutical market we estimate the following market power equation: 
Results
Estimation is performed in two steps. First, we estimate the demand model in order to identify the price effects on the demandboth branded and generics-and the effect of the index price model. Second, using information on price elasticities acquired from step one, we calculate the producer specific Lerner index and estimate the Lerner index process equation.
Endogeneity bias problems may arise when the unknown coefficients in the demand Eq. 5 are estimated by OLS. The reason is that the prices occurring on the right hand side in Eq. 4 depends on the market share through the price setting Eq. 8. There are thus good reasons to believe that unobserved elements in price setting are correlated with the error terms in the market share equations.
To obtain unbiased estimates we can either try to specify the joint probability for random market shares and random prices (and estimate the unknown coefficients in a full information maximum likelihood procedure) or to use instrument variables. We will apply the latter procedure and instrument prices.
We have instrumented the prices in a two-stage least square procedure. First, prices are estimated on instruments, and then the predicted values of prices are used in the demand equations. The instrument variables used in the first stage price regression should be variables that affect the supply side and are uncorrelated with the error terms in the demand equations. Good instruments are thus correlated with costs (cost shifters) but not with unobserved quality of the drugs that we are considering.
We have used two instruments. The first instrument is the price of similar drugs, with the same chemical substance but of much higher strength. Drugs of different strengths are used against different illnesses or different degrees of illnesses. This instrument is correlated with costs because the molecules and the other inactive substances in the drugs are the same. This is a strong instrument, but the markets of drugs with different strength differ with respect to number of drugs on the market, and moreover the entry of generics occurs at different dates. The level of competition is thus different in the different markets. See Hausman et al. [8] and Nevo [11] for studies that have used prices on similar goods as instruments.
Following Brenkers and Verboven [4] , the quantity sold by the same producers in the Norwegian market but with different ATC codes is used as the second instrument. We will argue that this variable contains useful information in a regulated and monopolistic market such as the pharmaceutical market. Sales of other drugs in the same markets signal that the producer has passed bureaucratic barriers related to regulations in the Norwe-gian market (familiarity) and also that the firm find it worth competing in this market (profitability).
Demand
Estimation results are set out in . Table 2. The direct effect of prices on demand is negative and significant. When the prices are instrumented, the direct price responses become numerical much higher. The impact of "market age" on demand is significantly positive when no instruments are used but disappears when instruments are used. This implies that the marginal price response on markets shares are the same for branded and generic drugs, and represented by a 0 . The development of price elasticities over time is therefore driven by changes in markets shares due to the index price and entry of producers. The impact of the yardstickbased price regulation on demand for generic drugs is significant and positive in both models. Using instruments, the effect becomes stronger.
. Table 3 shows the direct price elasticities derived from the above estimates and evaluated at sample average values for the six different markets and hence six different chemical substances.
Market power
Using the estimated demand functions, we calculate the value of the Lerner index for each producer. . Table 4 presents the results from the estimation of the Lerner index AR(1) model. These estimates imply that in the long run the Lerner index approaches:
0.1812 0.2866, 1-0.3720 = which means average market power approaches a level around 28 above the perfect competitive case. This long run outcome is far below, around 72, the initial monopoly case. Of course, this only demonstrates how important the different parameters are, given the observed data. Without the policy reform something else might have happened in the market, but clearly our results indicate that the index price policy had a significant impact on competition is this market.
Conclusions
In March 2003 the Norwegian government implemented yardstick-based price regulation schemes on a selection of drugs experiencing generic competition. The retail price cap, the "index price, " on a drug (chemical substance) was set equal to the average of the three lowest producer prices on that drug, plus a fixed wholesale and retail margin. This is supposed to lower barriers of entry for generic drugs and to reduce market power. Using monthly data over the period 1998-2004 for the six drugs (chemical entities) subjected to the index price regulation we estimate a structural model enabling us to examine the impact of the reform on both demand and market power. Our results suggest that the index price helped to increase the market shares of generic drugs and succeeded in reducing overall market power.
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